We previously posted Right to Challenge IRS Summonses Important With New IRS Audit Procedures! on June 19, 2014,where we discussed that
the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Clarke, No. 13-301,
reaffirming the right of a recipient of an IRS summons to challenge the summons
by examining IRS officials in an adversarial proceeding.
The impact of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Clarke will
be significant in light of a recent IRS directive (LB&I Control No: LB&I-04-0613-004),
effective January 2014, which mandates that IRS examining officers issue a
summons if a taxpayer fails to respond to an information document request (IDR)
during the information gathering phase of an examination. (See our post: 2014
LB&I Information Document Request (IDR) Enforcement Process - Ready or Not?).
However, it's important to understand that you need an attorney, and preferably an Experiance Tax Attorney,
to successfully file a Petition to Quash an IRS summons!
Case in point Fisher v. U.S., which was f:
Do You Have An IRS Summon
That Needs To Be Challenged?
Contact the Tax Lawyers at
Marini & Associates, P.A.
for a FREE Tax Consultation
Toll Free at 888-8TaxAid (888) 882-9243
Appeals Court Finds its standards for Examining Agents in summons cases largely unaltered by Clarke.
ReplyDeleteGangi, et al, v. U.S., (CA 1 3/30/2016) 116 AFTR 2d ¶2016-573
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, affirming a district court, has determined that its standard for determining whether a taxpayer is entitled to examine an IRS employee's motive for issuing a summons is, for purposes of the instant case, consistent with the standards set out by the Supreme Court in Clarke. As a result, it held that the district court that applied that Appeals Court standard didn't abuse its discretion in denying the taxpayer's motion seeking relief from the summons enforcement order.
The First Circuit found that the district court didn't abuse its discretion in applying “its pre-Clarke order in a post-Clarke world.” It stated that, for purposes of this case, Clarke didn't materially change the applicable law. The Court called the standard set out in Clarke “substantially equivalent” to that in Sugarloaf. It noted only one small distinction, in that Clarke explicitly stated that circumstantial evidence could be sufficient to warrant a hearing, but found this distinction meaningless in the current case because Gangi failed to refer to any specific evidence that would rebut IRS's prima facie showing of proper purpose.