The Supreme
Court has extended the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000). Apprendi held that the Sixth Amendment reserves to juries the
determination of any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that
increases a criminal defendant's maximum potential sentence.
In Southern Union Co. v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012), the question presented was
whether the same rule applied to sentences of criminal fines. Southern Union, a
natural gas company, was convicted of violating a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d) (2) (A), by knowingly storing liquid mercury without a permit. The jury
verdict form stated that Southern Union was guilty of unlawfully storing liquid
mercury "on or about September 19, 2002 to October 19, 2004." 132 S.
Ct. at 2349. Violations of the statute are punishable, inter alia, by "a
fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of violation." 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d) (2) (A). At sentencing, the probation office set a maximum fine of
$38.1 million, on the basis that Southern Union had violated the statute for
each of the 762 days from September 19, 2002 through October 19, 2004. Southern
Union objected that the calculation violated Apprendi because the jury
had not been asked to determine the precise duration of the violation.
Further
arguing that the verdict form and the court's instructions permitted conviction
if the jury found even a one-day violation, Southern Union maintained that the
only violation the jury necessarily found was for one day and that imposing any
fine greater than the single-day penalty of $50,000 would require fact finding
by the court, in contravention of Apprendi. While acknowledging that the
jury had not been asked to specify the duration of the violation, the
Government argued that Apprendi did not apply to criminal fines.
The district
court held that Apprendi applied, but it concluded from the verdict that
the jury had found a 762-day violation. The court therefore set a maximum
potential fine of $38.1 million and imposed a fine of $6 million and a
community service obligation of $12 million. On appeal, the First Circuit
rejected the district court's conclusion that the jury had necessarily found a
violation of 762 days, but it affirmed the sentence, holding, in conflict with
other circuits, that Apprendi did not apply to criminal fines.
The Supreme
Court reversed the First Circuit and held that Apprendi did apply to
criminal fines. The Court stated that it had applied Apprendi to a
variety of sentencing schemes involving imprisonment or a death sentence and
could see no principled basis under Apprendi for treating criminal fines
differently. The Court also rejected the Government's argument that fines are
less onerous than incarceration and the death sentence and thus do not
implicate the primary concerns motivating Apprendi. Not all fines are
insubstantial, however. Moreover, the relevant question is the significance of
the fine from the perspective of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee.
"Where a fine is substantial enough to trigger that right, Apprendi
applies in full." 132 S. Ct. at 2352. The Court remanded the case for
further proceedings.
Mark Rieber—Senior Attorney
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